Observations delivered on the launch of the Piddington Society's 2026-27 Civil Skills Course[1]
On the occasion of the opening of the Piddington Society's Civil Skills Course
Can I begin by commending each of you for making the substantial commitment to all that this course of teaching offers. It affords access to a lifetime of experience of two of this State's most outstanding past exponents of all the course covers, the Honourable Graeme Murphy and Chris Zelestis KC. Their authorship of the materials and design of the course brings together a wealth of experience. The course materials are rich with the knowledge and insights gained by them over many years as leaders of the commercial Bar and in Graeme's case, also as a judge and member of the Court of Appeal. The course is unique and well worth the effort. Its focus will afford a much deeper understanding of the nature of your work as a commercial barrister. It even has the prospect, may I suggest, of delivering greater personal satisfaction in your future work.
This evening, as you begin, I have been asked to say something specific about interpreting commercial instruments. It is a skill that all commercial barristers must master. But before I do, I propose to say something more general about the role of a barrister.
The work of a barrister requires unswerving commitment to identifying the real issues in dispute and confining the case to those issues. Finding the real issues requires analysis: that is, the application of a deep understanding of legal principle and forensic insight to the task at hand. It does not involve presenting the client's position. Or even starting your analysis with what the client thinks and then seeking to support that position. Or worse still, simply advancing the client's arguments.
You will become a far more effective barrister if you think about every instruction you receive as one which requires you to focus on the way the law would resolve the problem. Put aside searching for arguments to support a particular presupposed position, for sentences from cases, for words out of context or for propositions outside the support of fundamental principle that are in favour of your client. The law does not operate in such a fickle and flimsy way.
The law is not a means by which one party can overwhelm or subjugate another by cleverness or strategy. Rather, the law mediates between people. It stands between the parties to bring about a fair and just outcome. It does so by being principled, certain and consistent. It is able to respond to a wide range of circumstances. It seeks to be stable and predictable in its response.
Your job is to stand in the space between people and be the law's instrument, explaining the way it works and giving effect to its principles in the case you present. All that you do needs to be informed by what the law is doing. Essential to performing your role as an officer of the court is the development of a working theory of the way each case should be resolved according to legal principle. You can then identify the points at which there are legal or factual uncertainties to be resolved and judgments to be made. These are the places to focus your efforts, both as to forensic preparation and when advancing arguments to support the resolution of the case in your client's favour.
For these reasons, it is sometimes said that you need to look at a case from the judge's perspective not from the perspective of your client. That conjures the idea that you should look at the case independently. While that is true, it is a notion that captures only part of what is required. What you really need to focus on is the process of thinking that will guide the judge to a result. What will the judge look to in administering justice in the particular circumstances of the case?
The judge will be searching for the essential features of the case that will determine the law's answer to the case at hand. As a barrister, you need to be in there with the judge trying to do that too.[2] If you are not, most of what you say will likely be seen as being of little assistance. The judge will likely assess you as being of little or no help and will proceed unaided and unguided by any case concept or focussed submissions that you might have presented.
So, the adversarial system is not properly conceived as a battle between matching champions engaged in a trial by battle. Nor is it a debate between great orators trying to sway opinions or convict others to moral positions. Nor is it a forum in which to trumpet the distorted perspective of a particular party. It is a process that is intended to assist the judge in understanding the issues that need to be decided when it comes to identifying the appropriate way of intervening between the parties. Ultimately, the outcome must be supported by principled reasons that reflect the law's role. That is why a barrister best serves the client's interests by engaging with the task in the way I have described. It means the client’s position as to the matters that will affect the outcome are best presented in the client’s interests.
Turning then to the particular matter at hand. When it comes to giving meaning to the language of statutes or contracts, the law is concerned with giving legal power to the words used. Once spoken by Parliament or the parties, words are given breath as utterances that the law will act upon. It is a serious process that must be able to be explained and repeated. If it is perceived as random or unprincipled then the law itself will be perceived as having that character and those affected will lose trust and confidence in the institutions that administer the law. They will tend to resist submitting to its terms. They will move away from accepting that they should be governed by the terms of statutes or bound by the formal promises they have given.
As you would expect given their authorship, as part of the course materials you have been provided with outstanding practical papers explaining the tasks of both statutory construction and the interpretation of commercial instruments. The papers are a rare gift - it would otherwise take you years to grasp the topics they concern so succinctly. They will repay reading a number of times and being kept close at hand or, better still, the committing of their insights to your professional memory.
In the case of commercial instruments, the objective theory of contract proceeds on the basis that the parties have enlivened and animated their words to produce binding obligations that they cannot alter or take back except by further agreement between them. The formality of their dealings and the promises they have exchanged mean that they will be held to what they have agreed, as manifested by the words they have chosen to use. It does not matter what they thought they were doing or what they wish they had said after the event. It does not matter that they regret what they agreed to or that it is now less commercially palatable than it was seen to be at the time. It is the objective meaning of the words used in the relevant clause of the agreement that must be ascertained. These aspects inform in a fundamental way how the meaning of a commercial instrument is to be interpreted.[3]
I want to begin with the proposition, often stated, that in order to properly construe the language of a commercial contract it is necessary to have regard to the contract as a whole. It is a phrase that conjures a number of different ideas that I wish to try and unpack. It is worth focussing upon them, because the notion of the contract as a whole lies at the heart of the construction task.
What is being determined is the meaning of words that only have legal effect as part of the whole contract. This is why, I would suggest, it is necessary to start with the contract as a whole rather than with the particular contested words or the bits of the contract that your client seeks to rely upon. Speaking broadly, the idea of regard to the contract as a whole captures the notion that all language must be understood in context.[4] Because every expression in a contract is intended to speak as part of the whole contract you need to read the contract as a whole to interpret the language of a particular clause.
It has been said that the sentence is the unit by which communication occurs. It is true that we do not convey meaning by uttering individual words.[5] The semantic range of meaning for most words usually requires context to understand the precise sense in which the word is being used. That is why arguments conjured by reference to dictionary definitions of individual words are usually of little to no assistance in discerning the meaning of a document.[6] But it is also the case that every sentence that forms part of a document takes its meaning from its place within the whole document in which it appears.
Regard to the whole of the contractual instrument has a number of distinct aspects.
The first aspect is the notion that a contract has a commercial object or purpose that may be discerned from regard to the whole of its terms.[7] The nature of a contract is that its various provisions are intended to operate together in order to effect a dealing or to govern an ongoing relationship. Much is to be gained from a careful formulation of what the contract is actually about. In this respect, a description given by the parties may be relevant but is never decisive. A careful examination of the collection of promises is more instructive. What is the transaction they record or the relationship they regulate? You should always try and describe that purpose or object. It may be a familiar dealing, or it may be a bespoke one. In either case it is necessary to articulate the overall nature of the dealing that is recorded by the instrument so you can place its language within a broad understanding, derived from all the words used, of what the document is doing.
The second aspect flows from the first. It concerns whether the contract is one which is intended to speak separately from its surrounding circumstances.[8] Some contracts record terms which are to apply to third parties. Consider, for example, a bill of lading, an assignable joint venture interest or a contract of insurance that is to cover all the participants in a project. An understanding of the object or purpose may be a reason why the instrument should be construed according to its terms without regard to surrounding circumstances. Otherwise, relevant external context (or surrounding circumstances) should be identified and brought to bear. That context should then be used to revisit (and reformulate, if necessary) the overall purpose or object of the commercial instrument.
The third aspect is that regard to the whole of the contract enables a view to be formed as to the degree of formality with which the instrument has been prepared.[10] Is it detailed? Is it informal? Is it a model of consistency? Is it comprehensive? Is it in a standard form? Is it grammatically coherent? Does it strive for plain English or draw upon phrases with established legal or contextual meaning? These matters bear upon the way in which its terms would be understood when viewed objectively through the perspective of a reasonable businessperson and provide fertile ground for developing convincing arguments as to its interpretation.[11] Significantly, they are matters that bear upon the extent to which a number of other presumptions or rules, that draw upon the contract as a whole, may be used. It is to those other aspects of regard to the contract as whole to which I now turn. They comprise the fourth aspect of construing the document as a whole.
Regard to a contract as a whole to discern (a) its object or purpose; (b) the extent to which it speaks independently of surrounding circumstances; and (c) the formality with which it has been prepared, inform whether various approaches should be adopted as to its construction, sometimes called presumptions or rules - but really just aspects of reading the whole of the instrument.
This process was described in Fitzgerald v Masters[12] in the following way:[13]
It is trite law that an instrument must be construed as a whole. Indeed it is the only method by which inconsistencies of expression may be reconciled and it is in this natural and common sense approach to problems of construction that justification is to be found for the rejection of repugnant words, the transposition of words and the supplying of omitted words. … Many illustrations may be given of the circumstances in which these processes have been followed but to do so would add nothing to the rule that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the instrument as a whole and that this intention when ascertained will govern its construction …
(citations omitted)
Let me try and enumerate some of the main processes used to construe the instrument as a whole.
First, the manner of operation of each clause of the instrument must be construed as being intended to work in harmony with every other clause.[14] The provisions do not operate in isolation. They operate together. So, each clause of the contract must be interpreted in a way that will enable the provisions to work with and interact with other provisions of the contract.
Second, where possible, effect should be given to every word of a contract.[15] Obvious boilerplate to one side, key provisions of a contract have been included for a reason. Consequently, there is a presumption against a meaning that would render the words of a particular clause redundant in the sense that it would have no meaningful field of operation. The parties having taken the care to include the language of the clause, it is likely that they thought it would have some possible operation.
Of course, repetition for emphasis or out of an abundance of caution may be an explanation for two clauses with the same effect.[16] The question then is whether the same concept is addressed to reinforce the existence of the obligation or whether the apparent repetition is actually directed to different aspects. Your task is to explain which.
Third, it is likely that the parties used the same terminology with consistency in meaning and used different words when they intended to convey a different meaning.[17] Application of this principle must have regard to the overall characteristics of the drafting. It is a principle that carries less weight where the document does not exhibit consistency in expression or care in use of terminology. There is also the phenomenon in English of 'elegant variation' whereby there is a tendency to avoid repeated use of the same term because it is considered more attractive and erudite to do so. In a contract recorded by letter, that aspect may be an explanation for different words being used to convey the same idea. But that too would call upon the overall character of the instrument to aid in its construction.
Fourth, more general provisions will usually be read as being qualified by more specific ones.[19] Having included both, it is unlikely that the general provision was intended to apply to the specific case addressed by another provision with the consequence of overriding the operation of the specific provision.
Fifth, absurdity or illogicality in operation measured against the overall object or purpose may lead to rejection of one available construction.[20] It is now well established that the court approaches any contract on the basis that the parties intended its terms to produce a commercial result and to avoid it 'making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience'. [21]
It is very important to observe that the cases in this area do not entrust to the court an ex post facto ability to assess the present commercial consequences of a particular interpretation of an agreement.[22]
It is necessary to found any use of an alleged lack of commerciality upon a properly formulated submission as to the purpose or object of the contract. This too will require regard to the contract as a whole, considered in the context of any relevant surrounding circumstances. Views as to what is 'commercial' may vary. This principle is usually expressed in terms of commercial nonsense, unreasonableness and inconvenience. The lack of commerciality must be so pronounced that it will indicate that some different construction must have been intended.[23]
The process of using these tools is iterative.[24] It involves using the object or purpose of the contract and its characteristics to form a view that guides construction of particular clauses. Rival meanings are then checked and may expose possibilities that bear upon the understanding of the agreement as a whole. They then require regard to the individual provisions in the way I have described but guided by the revised view as to the overall purpose or object.
Importantly, these are all outworkings of regard to the whole of the contract. There is no authority that will require one of these presumptions to be applied in a particular case. Rather, they are properly seen as tools of analysis that will be deployed in circumstances where they are justified by regard to the nature and characteristics of the contract as a whole. They each have to be reasoned in the particular circumstances of the case. In every case, insight into meaning is delivered through the process I have described.
These matters direct attention away from singular focus upon the words in issue. So, do not focus in on the disputed words. Do not approach the task by reading those words and then simply spouting the meaning that your client contends for. Do not look for random parts of the contract that support your client's case if read in isolation. Give respect to the objective nature of the task as one which requires interpretation of the words within the whole of the contract. Work out what the deal is and how carefully or loosely it has been expressed. Undertake the task of considering the whole. It is fundamental to the way the law works when construing disputed terms of a contract. Understanding the whole instrument will reveal the ways in which the operation of one part casts light on the meaning of another part.
Broadly speaking, in construing a statute the same approach is required, save that the issue of formality is more about the audience to whom the instrument is directed and the presumptions or principles of construction are somewhat different and reflect the constitutional nature of the task being undertaken.[25] For example, there is the principle of legality by which Parliament is presumed not to override fundamental common law rights and freedoms without clear language.[26]
But that is a whole topic in and of itself and this evening is a time for introduction only. I wish you well with the rest of the course.
[1] These observations are a revised version of remarks presented on the commencement of an earlier version of the course. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my research associate Sophia Stannard in undertaking research as to the matters covered.
[2] See also Zeims v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 298 (Kitto J): a barrister 'is, by virtue of a long tradition, in a relationship of intimate collaboration with the judges, as well as with [their] fellow members of the Bar, in the high task of endeavouring to make successful the service of the law to the community'.
[3] The Court adopts an 'objective approach': Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 at [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) ('Electricity Generation Corporation').
[4] See also Herzfeld P and Prince T, Interpretation (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 2020) at 483-484: where the authors refer to the 'entire text' of the instrument as its 'documentary context'.
[5] See, for example, Fell v Fell (1922) 31 CLR 268 at 276 (Isaacs J) quoting Roe, on the demise of George Dodson, Esq v Grew (1767) Wilm 272 at 278 (Wilmot CJ): 'words are only pictures of ideas upon paper'.
[6] Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541 at 560 (Mahoney JA); see also at 552-553 (Kirby P).
[7] Interpretation at 484-485.
[8] See, for example, Westfield Management Limited v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited [2007] HCA 45; (2007) 233 CLR 528 at [37]-[45] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ) (a case concerned with the proper construction of an easement on Torrens system land); Allandale Blue Metal Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services [2013] NSWCA 103 at [42]-[48] (Meagher JA), [154]-[163] (Ward JA), cf [24]-[34] (Macfarlan JA) (letter providing development consent); Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd [2006] FCAFC 144; (2006) 156 FCR 1 at [57]-[66], [73] (Weinberg J), [123]-[124] (Kenny J), [225]-[226] (Lander J) (corporate constitution).
[9] Consider, for example, the public aspect of instruments mentioned in fn 8 above; consider also the application of an industrial award to relevant employees and employers: King v Melbourne Vicentre Swimming Club Inc [2021] FCAFC 123 at [43] (Collier, Katzmann and Jackson JJ).
[10] See, for example, Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528 at 532 (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ) (informal agreement arose out of an oral conversation): 'Where parties reach an agreement which is expressed informally, whether in writing or orally, the terms of their bargain are not ordinarily recorded in meticulous detail in the words which they use. To ascertain their relevant intention it is often necessary to resort to inference, a process for which there is little or no scope when the parties have taken care to comprehensively record the terms of their agreement in written form'.
[11] Referring again to the 'reasonable business person' test: see Electricity Generation Corporation at [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
[12] (1956) 95 CLR 420 ('Fitzgerald').
[13] Fitzgerald at 437 (McTiernan, Webb and Taylor JJ).
[14] Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Limited (1973) 129 CLR 99 at 109 (Gibbs J). See also Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522 at [16] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
[15] Price v Spoor [2021] HCA 20; (2021) 270 CLR 450 at [24] (Gageler and Gordon JJ); Chapmans Ltd v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 402 at 411 (Lockhart and Hill JJ).
[16] See Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Hans Bo Kristian Holgersson trading as Holgerssons Complete Home Service [2019] WASCA 114 at [53]-[55] (Buss P, Beech and Pritchard JJA).
[17] See, for example, Acorn Consolidated Pty Ltd v Hawkslade Investments Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 425 at [66] (Owen J). An example where this presumption applied to give the same word consistent meaning can be found in Victoria v Tatts Group Ltd [2016] HCA 5 at [55] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ).
[18] See, for example, Buick v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1957) 97 CLR 599 at 604 (Dixon CJ), at 619 (Kitto J).
[19] See, for example, Findex Group Limited v McKay [2020] FCAFC 182 at [156] (Markovic, Banks-Smith and Anderson JJ)citing Hume Steel Limited v Attorney-General for Victoria (1927) 39 CLR 455 at 466 (Higgins J).
[20] Dainford Limited v Smith (1985) 155 CLR 342 at 364 (Brennan J) citing Gwyn v Neath Canal Co (1868) 6 CB 662 at 215 and Walker v Giles (1848) 6 CB 662 at 701-702; NGL Properties Pty Ltd v Harlington Pty Ltd [1979] VR 92 at 95 (Kaye J); Tokio at [57] (Buss P, Beech JA, Pritchard JA).
[21] Electricity Generation Corp at [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) quoting Zhu v Treasurer of the State of New South Wales [2004] HCA 56; (2004) 218 CLR 530 at [82]; Black Box Control Pty Ltd v TerraVision Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 219 at [42] (point 9) (Newnes JA).
[22] See generally Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited [2015] HCA 37; (2015) 256 CLR 104 at [50] (French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ) citing Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 352-353.
[23] Rockment Pty Ltd t/a Vanilla Lounge v AAI Limited t/a Vero Insurance [2020] FCAFC 228; (2020) 282 FCR 561 at [54] (Besanko, Derrington and Colvin JJ).
[24] HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Hartnett [2016] NSWCA 342 at [134] (Leeming JA) quoting Re Sigma Finance Corp [2009] UKSC 2 at [12] (Lord Mance).
[25] For a helpful overview in this respect see Barnes J, Dharmananda J and Moran E, Modern Statutory Interpretation: Framework, Principles and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2023) 'Part IV - The Provision, and the Act as a Whole' at 219ff.
[26] Ibid 'Chapter 28' at 432-449.






