COMITY AND COMMERCE
Address to the 16th Conference of Chief Justices of Asia & the Pacific
Chief Justice James Allsop

INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCE
1	I was assigned this topic on your behalf. It is a topic of great interest, and some difficulty. Not the least of the difficulty is the construction of a coherent relationship between the broad elements of the title: “commerce” and “comity” and the sub-topics identified: recognition of judgments, arbitral awards and application of foreign law.
2	As I began to seek to draw together various ideas, it struck me that one should begin with, and linger a little upon, commerce and its historical role as a vehicle for some of the nobler aspirations of men and women. One should not be, of course, too starry-eyed about the nobility of the middle-man or trader. Yet out of the, to a degree, selfish activity of the search for commercial gain, one derives some of the most important and enduring conceptions in law. More particularly, in an increasingly transnational and international world, courts are more regularly meeting questions of principle and judgment that require a balance of national interest and respect for, or at least consideration of, the place of courts and of other countries. To appreciate the relevant informing considerations in any particular contemporary problem, it is helpful to have a little history and theory.
3	Commerce and trade have long had a central place in the development of societies and in the formation of sophisticated legal systems. Indeed it has been said that “commerce is older than history” and that it “traces back its origin to the first germ of society”. Jhering spoke of the fact that: “Long before the State arose from its couch, in the morning twilight of history, trade had already completed a good part of its day’s work. While the States were fighting one another, trade found out and levelled the road which led from one people to another, and established between them a relation of exchange of goods and ideas; a pathfinder in the wilderness, a herald of peace, a torchbearer of culture.” We must be careful, therefore, not to overlook or underestimate the extent to which commerce has shaped (and continues to influence) the basic facets of our societies, or the manner in which it has helped form the legal and moral norms for our modern society (which continues to be based on a system of exchange and relation with other peoples). 
4	Commerce can be seen to play an instrumental role because it was through commerce that otherwise isolated and disparate groups came to interact. The growth in wealth associated with such trade allowed nations to expand beyond their existing territories and led to the foundation of new settlements along major trade routes. In turn this increased participation in commerce produced the need for rules of relational activities to be formed as well as creating the potential for conflicts to arise between merchants, and between nations. Commerce therefore was required to develop and apply its own rules and codes of behaviour, to require its participants to behave in a trustworthy and honest way (in order to foster certainty and confidence in the market), and to be overtly opposed and hostile to any “spirit of corrupt ambition”. In order for commerce (and society) to continue to grow, its participants needed to be able to deal with each other peacefully and with mutual benefit. From these early commercial practices we can trace many principles and norms of our modern commercial legal system, including reasonableness, unjust enrichment, good faith and fair dealing, and honesty and fairness, to name a few. 
5	A moment’s reflection on the trading circles and routes spanning the world before European colonisation began in the 15th century would inform the necessary connection of habit, custom, law and reciprocity amongst North Asia, South East Asia, South Asia and the Sub-Continent, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Europe and the Baltic. 
6	An examination of the influence of commerce upon society, and in particular upon the theoretical underpinnings of our modern public and private international legal system, leads one to the broad, not necessarily well-defined concept of comity. Comity has, from its very beginning, been inextricably linked to international commerce and, indeed, owes its very existence to the pressures and demands of commerce and of transnational trade. It is a doctrine that was built upon the recognition that “nothing could be more inconvenient to commerce and to international usage than that transactions valid by the law of one place should be rendered of no effect elsewhere on the account of a difference in the law”. Comity is a topic of particular interest to modern commercial law practice because of its relationship with conflicts of law and transnational and regional cooperation.
7	Debates about conflicts of law are certainly as old as international trade. Different theories have emerged as to the appropriate response to such conflicts, including Dicey’s “vested rights” theory, Cook’s “local law” theory, and Savigny’s “territory/seat” analysis. Comity is one of these theories. It is, at its essence, an attempt to provide guidance and justification for why laws and decrees from one country should have application elsewhere, whether that be in the form of choice of law, enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments, or the staying of proceedings by anti-suit injunctions. All are part of the reconciliation of territorial sovereignty with the practical difficulties and realities created by transnational trade and commerce. In judicial proceedings today, the term “comity” is generally explicitly invoked in three circumstances – applications for anti-suit injunctions or stay of proceedings, the enforcement of foreign judgments or arbitral awards, or as a principle requiring courts in one country to try to avoid infringing on the interests (executive, legislative, or judicial) of a foreign country. In academic discourse the notion of comity arises in the consideration attending to transnational commercial law, international conventions, and commercial principles relating to transnational litigation and arbitration.
8	Before considering the usefulness of comity to law, and commerce, today, one must seek to grasp its nature. How did comity emerge as a legal doctrine? What exactly is it? What does the term mean and imply? What purpose was and is it meant to serve? Does it in fact have any continuing relevance today? 
9	Despite the fact that the doctrine has operated for almost five centuries, and has been subject to extensive judicial discussion in the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States of America (including by notable jurists such as Mansfield and Story) as well as extensive academic discussion (including from notable authors such as von Savigny and Dicey), there is still a degree of uncertainty and elusiveness surrounding it. It has been described variously as a principle of courtesy, politeness, deference, respect, convenience, goodwill, expediency, reciprocity, conflict, and necessity. Some authors have described it as acting as a “bridge and a wall”, others as a theory regarding “sovereign interests”, and some have stated that it is “a phrase which is grating to the ear” and which is “incompatible with the judicial function”. 
COMITY AND COMMERCE – BRIEF HISTORY AND THEORY
10	Law changes across time and societies, reflecting social and organisational changes of humans. When humanity was comprised of separate, cloistered, agricultural societies, such groups developed, as a matter of custom and practice, their own societal norms and rules which reflected the specific circumstances and relations of that society, and were intended to apply only to its citizens and residents (in Roman Law: ius civile). For the majority of such persons, there would be little, or no, interaction or intermingling with other societies. Questions of conflict and the applicability of foreign law did not often arise, nor was society as a whole required to develop principles to deal with them. 
11	Not so for those engaged in commerce. Those who dared to tread beyond their own borders – the trader, the merchant, the mariner – and who in turn conducted business with foreign citizens, found themselves in situations where no formal law existed and therefore where relations with foreign citizens could (often) not be resolved by existing domestic institutions. Such persons required more than the juristic body of law offered. In time they provided their own solution, by developing commercial rules and principles to govern trade practices based on issues which arose in recurring and common business arrangements. Such customs in turn became universally recognised as their own separate system of law (what may be regarded as early forms of trade usage, lex mercatoria, or transnational commercial law), as well as at times becoming enshrined in legal codes. This may be seen, for example, in the reference in various historical texts to commercial codes of conduct and customary trade practices (particularly with regards to maritime trade) including The Laws of Manu (circa 1500BCE) which refers to the laws “of guilds”, the various unwritten and customary codes in Greece and Egypt, and in the reference to (and application of) the “maritime law of the Rhodians” within Justinian’s Digest. 
12	The force of this customary law is evident in the fact that, over time, courts and tribunals came to support and recognise claims based on it. For example, in the sixth century Justinian’s Digest reference is made to an instance of conflict of maritime laws, and details the decision that the customary law (the “maritime law of the Rhodians”) would apply in the absence of any State law “opposed to it”. Likewise the growth in presence of foreign persons, and commercial interactions with them, required Roman law to develop a separate field of law which could recognise and govern such foreign relations (ius gentium) and separate courts to administer law involving foreign persons (praetor peregrinus). Notably it was commerce and international trade that drove these changes in the formal law and organisation of the law courts, as well as commerce which provided the basic principles to settle legal disputes in this area, including the laws of jettison and maritime liens. 
13	Relevantly, ius gentium was regarded as being not only the law to govern relations with foreign individuals, but also as a law of universal application which could govern international relations – a “law of nations”. Thus liabilities arising under the ius gentium bound a person regardless of where they were physically located – the territorial limits of different nations did not extinguish the liabilities and rights arising under the law which was common to them all. This was contrasted with ius civile which governed only those in the territory in which it was made. In such a system, questions of conflicts of law were resolved by providing that where there was conflict between the applicable ius civile, then the law of nations (ius gentium) would instead be applied. 
14	It is beyond the confines of this paper, but the place of commerce and the merchant class, and the cities and boroughs in which they lived, in the development of the political and legal theories based on the individual and individual rights is a topic of great interest.
15	It is important to recognise that the activity most central to international trade and commerce, and which has done the most in the development of international commercial intercourse and international commercial law, is maritime law. The lex maritima (as part of the lex mercatoria) dates back in an unwritten form to at least 3000BC, and in a written form as far back as 800BC, which served as a means of regulating and disposing of business disputes. This law was not the law of any one nation in particular. Rather it developed separately to, and independently of, national laws. As Justice Jackson stated in Lauritzen v Larsen, maritime law had “the force of law, not from extra-territorial reach of national laws, nor from abdication of its sovereign powers by any nation, but from acceptance by common consent of civilised communities of rules designed to foster amicable and workable commercial relations”. Importantly, this law pursued the aims of “stability, comity, forbearance, reciprocity and long-range national interest” in order to “avoid parochial national jealousies and competing laws governing international conduct, in particular commercial conduct”.
16	Our region has been inextricably linked to maritime trade and commerce, and in turn to rules from the lex maritima, almost from its very beginning. Early historical accounts of Asian Pacific trading history, for example, indicate that by at least the Han Dynasty (200BC-200AD) maritime trade routes had been established within the South East Asian, Indo-Chinese, North Sumatran, Myanmar and South Indian regions, whilst land trade had expanded with the development of the Silk Road which eventually connected China, the Indian subcontinent, Persia, Europe, the Horn of Africa, and Arabia. Furthermore, whereas Western Europe experienced a period of decline in trade and economic prosperity after the fall of the Western Roman Empire (where, until about the 12th century, commerce “was not the nature but an extraordinary activity”), trade in the Asia Pacific and Middle Eastern regions continued to expand, as nations explored new territories and new independent states emerged. Indeed up until about the 15th century world trade and cultural exchange was dominated by the maritime and land trade routes in the Middle East and Far East. This is reflected, for example, in the comments of Ibn Battuta (a Tangiers-born lawyer, merchant and geographer of the 14th century) who described Calicut in South West India as one of the largest harbours in the world visited by men from China, Sumatra, Ceylon, the Maldives, Yemen, Persia and ‘all quarters’, and described “Zayton” in China as the largest harbour in the world with hundreds of vessels. 
17	During this extended period (of over a millennium) of economic growth and international trade, the Asia Pacific region in turn developed its own lex maritima. Thus Sir Alexander Johnston (Third Chief Justice of Ceylon), when writing in about 1822 of the judicial and jurisprudential systems of the East, referred to the “maritime laws and usages as prevail respectively amongst all the different maritime people of Asia, consisting of Arabs, Maldivians, Malays, Hindoos and Chinese, who from time immemorial have had separate maritime laws and usages of their own”. Sir Alexander Johnston later described this law as being comprised: “partly of Hindoo, partly of Malay, partly of Maldivian, partly of Persian, partly of Arabian, partly of Cingalese, and partly of Chinese origin; that a few of them are derived from the laws of Rhodes, Oleron, Itisbury, and the Consolato-del-Mare; some of which were introduced by the Arabs, from the Mediterranean, into the Indian seas, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.” Unfortunately, although Sir Alexander proposed there to be an “authentic collection of all the maritime laws and usages of the different people of Asia” to enable judges in Great Britain to become acquainted with such laws, and to be able to enforce them, such a collection does not appear to exist and, for the most part, the specific details of this law (and discussions about it) have been lost, and our understanding of lex maritima has instead been dominated by the customs developed in Europe. 
18	Today commercial customs and practices (in both a “trade usage” sense and more formalised lex mercatoria) continue to influence the approach of courts, merchants, and practitioners, in our region. Aspects of this can be seen, for example, in the law relating to international arbitration – governed today by instruments and international conventions such as the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law – which has been transformed into “transnational harmonised legislation” and which, like the lex maritima, has developed in a truly transnational, rather than national nature. The presence of such law is particularly significant for discussions of conflicts of law since, in the presence of a truly transnational, uniform, and universal law, such discussions need not arise. 
19	To turn to the evolution of theories of conflict of laws, the 11th and 12th centuries saw a rapid increase in population in Europe and the emergence and development of separate city-states, and commercial and political frameworks such as the Hanseatic League. Importantly this period also saw a shift in the approach of city-state legal systems – away from a focus on citizenship (where the applicability of law depended on a person’s status as a citizen or non-citizen) to a focus on the nature of the law itself and whether it required territorial or extra-territorial effect.  In turn, this increase in foreign trade and its diversification to include Arab states and South East Asia, created the potential for conflict of laws to re-emerge. A new principle was required to provide a rational basis for determining the relevant and applicable choice of law for a given scenario. 
20	From Italy in the 12th and 13th centuries, a principle of “statutism” developed. This required both the relevant law, and the person or thing to whom or which it was to be applied, to be interpreted by reference to its status as personal, real, or mixed. This determined whether the law had territorial or extra-territorial effect. To provide an illustration, in most cases where the law concerned property (real or chattel), then the applicable law would be that of the place where the property was situated. In contrast where a law referred to an attribute of a person (such as their marital status) then it would have extraterritorial effect, and foreign states would be expected to recognise and apply the law (the law would “follow the person”). The essential basis of this doctrine was the intention that there would be reciprocal treatment of local law by foreign courts to nationals overseas – that the law could have extra-territorial application and would be recognised by a foreign court. This approach to conflict of laws was commonly employed across much of continental Europe, including Italy, France, the Netherlands, Bavaria, and Germany.
21	The doctrine became complicated by the growing recognition of “party autonomy” in the 16th century, according to which the parties to a contract could choose the applicable law to govern their contractual dealings, and could in so doing transcend the authority of the law. This development both reflected the desire of commercial parties during this time to exert a degree of control over the applicable law for their bargain, as well as their desire to know, with confidence, the law that would be applied to their dealings, in light of the fact that the statutist approach had at times produced arbitrary and contradictory conclusions. Such commercial concerns remain relevant for today’s international legal framework, as can be seen in the increased use of “choice of forum” and “choice of law” clauses.  
22	Further complications arose from the emergence and development of national sovereignty from about the 16th century, in particular from the writings of Bodin who argued that each state must have absolute and perpetual sovereignty. This created a conundrum for conflicts theorists. If it was true that all nations were regarded as sovereign (and therefore in complete control of their own territory, including the laws to be applied within it) how could it be that, under the doctrine of statutism, one country could expect its laws to be applied by another country (that its laws could have extra-territorial application)? 
23	It was comity that was used to reconcile this discord between sovereignty and extra-territoriality of laws. Jurists within the Dutch Republic were particularly concerned about this discord, having only recently (in 1581) asserted their independence from Spain, and having to now face the struggle of unifying the various Dutch provinces and justifying the application of foreign law by them, to ensure a degree of uniformity across the republic. Furthermore the Dutch Republic had at this time quickly emerged as a commercially centred, sea-faring society with a liberal attitude towards trade with foreigners, and in turn it became a strong participant in world trade in the 16th and 17th centuries. Conflict of laws between traders was thus an increasingly relevant consideration. 
24	The influential Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber contended in 1689 that the question of conflict of laws was essentially one concerning the administration of public affairs, with the appropriate enquiry being: What is it that different countries owe to each other? Huber first rejected the approach of statutism and contended instead that all law was inherently territorial (with each State free to decide what law it would apply within its forum). He then argued that, as a matter of mutual respect, individual nations would uphold the rights and liabilities acquired by a person in a foreign jurisdiction. Such recognition was justified by Huber on the basis that matters of common practice between nations (international commerce and trade, and also the interests of justice) compelled there to be mutual indulgence by each nation, or otherwise “an infinite number of acts and contracts would each day become of no effect, nor could commerce by land and by sea subsist.” This recognition was, however, limited by the fact that foreign laws and rights would only retain their force so long as they do “not cause prejudice to the powers or rights of [another] government or of their subjects”. In addition such recognition was not the result of a binding international obligation, but rather was a matter of free will, in order to accord with the requirements of national sovereignty.  
25	Ultimately comity was intended by Huber to pursue “the aspirational goal of doing justice in individual cases, as well as the practical goal of creating an international environment in which transnational commerce could flourish”. It was predominantly a theoretical doctrine (rather than a practical or prescriptive one), designed to justify why a sovereign nation would choose to forego exercising its own power and recognise another state’s power instead. Whilst Huber did develop general maxims for when foreign laws should be recognised for certain classes of cases, it was ultimately left to the domestic sovereign to determine whether recognition and effect should be granted in specific cases (although bearing in mind the overarching goals of comity – to foster justice and commerce). 
26	One can see clearly in this doctrine Huber’s desire to provide security to transactions in international commerce, perhaps in turn reflecting the Dutch Republic’s status at this time. In order to facilitate confidence in commercial dealings Huber called upon the Roman law ideas of ius gentium, and on pre-existing customary maritime and trade usage principles (lex mercatoria), in order to create a general legal principle which could form the basis for the recognition of foreign laws and foreign judgments. In this way extraterritorial recognition of rights became a basic principle for international usage, but as a matter of discretion rather than as an obligation, in order to recognise that each nation had the right (based on its territorial sovereignty) to refuse to recognise foreign law, particularly where it would be antithetical to their own public policy interests. 
27	This idea spread. In Scotland Huber’s doctrine was cited in approval as early as 1711, where it was held to require “respect and civility, but not as excluding review”, with the further recognition that the principle was restricted to decrees “consonant to the law of nations” and which “contain nothing contradictory to the particular laws of that country where it is craved to be put in execution”. Notably the Court recognised the place of commerce in developing this doctrine, stating that the rule was “founded on great necessity and expediency, for the facilitating of trade and commerce, and for keeping up a good correspondence amongst independent nations”. By 1728, in Scotland the term “comity” had come to be adopted as a matter of course, with the Scottish Court of Sessions stating that “out of comity the Court of Session may give countenance to English decrees”. 
28	In England, by the 17th and 18th centuries, the influence of lex maritima, as well as the nation’s status as an important centre for maritime trade and commerce, had meant that ideas of “comity of nations” and “law of nations” were prevalent, particularly within Admiralty courts. In 1678 Lord Nottingham stated that “it is against the law of nations not to give credit to the judgment and sentences of foreign countries…for what right hath one kingdom to reverse the judgment of another…and what confusion would follow in Christendom, if they should serve us so abroad, and give no credit to our sentences”. Comity was not, however, universally recognised. For instance, in 1778 Lord Hardwicke, as Chancellor, examined a Welsh decision “because the original decree was in the court of Wales, whose decisions were clearly liable to be examined”. 
29	It was the great Lord Mansfield who was instrumental in introducing comity into English law. Lord Mansfield was required, on a number of occasions during his time on the bench, to consider instances of conflicts of law and to determine whether English or foreign law should be applied. In such cases Lord Mansfield rejected the statutist approach (which dictated that the law follows a man everywhere) in favour of Huber’s statement that all law was inherently territorial. Furthermore he also demonstrated his willingness to uphold foreign judgments and decrees. Lord Mansfield’s judgments during this period are relevant also for another reason – he was a champion of the harmonisation of commercial law and common law, and sought to bring commercial customs into the framework of the common law. Thus in a number of commercial cases Lord Mansfield determined that it was the “law of nations” and the lex mercatoria which provided the governing law (in a similar vein to ius gentium), and that it was upon that basis that matters of conflict with foreign law should be resolved. These statements in turn were intended to facilitate international trade and commerce.
30	Importantly Lord Mansfield, although supporting comity and the recognition of foreign law and judgments, also noted that limitations must be made upon such recognition and, to that end, emphasised the importance of public policy in the exceptions to comity. This is seen clearly in one of his most famous cases – Somerset v Stewart. The case involved a situation of conflict of laws: Should Somerset’s status as a slave under American law be given extra-territorial effect in England? Was it a legal status which followed him to England and could have legal force there? The argument was put that, on the basis of comity, England should uphold that status. Lord Mansfield rejected this argument, stating that the “state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law…Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England”. In doing so Lord Mansfield provided a clear example of the fact that comity did not oblige one nation to apply the laws of another, but rather that “[e]very nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions, on which its exercise may be justly demanded.”
31	More overt recognition of the principle of comity, and its place within the conflict of laws discussion, developed in the 19th century in America following the publication of Joseph Story’s 1834 commentary Conflict of Laws. This work represented the first truly comprehensive extra-judicial exposition in Anglo-American law on the subject, and served both to formalise the doctrine of comity and to reject the statutist method (which had continued to form the basis of numerous academic writings prior to Story). It later became regarded as an authoritative work on the topic within both America and England. 
32	In his commentary Story rejected the suggestion (from authors such as Livermore) that international law (the law of nations) imposed an obligation upon courts to apply foreign law, and argued instead that the courts were given a freedom and discretion to apply or not apply foreign law. In doing so Story expressly adopted the notion of comity as developed by Huber, and focused the doctrine upon a concern to do justice, stating that it was based on: 
“mutual interest and utility; from the sense of the inconveniences which would arise from a contrary doctrine; and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice in order that justice may be done to us in return…There is then not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase “comity of nations”, but it is the most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another. It is derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the latter”. 
33	Like his predecessors, Story also noted that comity did not require a state to recognise foreign law where that would be prejudicial to its own interests. Notably Story also made reference to decisions of Justice Mansfield and concluded that the doctrine of comity had already, by that time, been sanctioned in England and America. Story’s work was later adopted by the United States’ Supreme Court in 1839 in Bank of Augusta v Earle (Story being a justice of the Court).  
34	Ultimately Story sought to rely on comity “as a means of reconciling notions of absolute territorial sovereignty” and “laws within a nation’s territory”, and the conflict of laws brought about through travel and commerce between several States. This subject was particularly pertinent for its American audience in light of the significant degree of legal distinction between the various States, as well as the fact that the nation was an increasing participant in international commerce (Story, for example, noted that “commerce is now so absolutely universal among all countries…that without some common principles…there would be utter confusion of rights and remedies”). 
35	Together these three jurists – Huber, Mansfield, and Story – can be regarded as the founders of the modern principles of comity and as articulating the basic ideas upon which the doctrine continues to operate today. What these three can be seen to have in common is a commitment to protecting and affirming the law of the forum and of the territorial sovereignty of each nation, by declaring first, that foreign law would only be recognised “in the absence of conflict with public policy or the rights of citizens of the forum” and secondly, that such recognition was based on mutual respect for the needs of justice and commerce, rather than on a sense of obligation. In addition they each demonstrated a commitment to facilitating trading relations between independent nations and provinces and to providing a sense of security for commercial parties (to replace the previously arbitrary and uncertain approach of statutism). 
COMITY TODAY
36	How then has the doctrine continued to develop in the 181 years since Story’s Conflict of Laws commentary was written? In particular, how have these theoretical and early ideas been applied in modern practice? Does comity still bear these features or has it changed in the ensuing process of interpretation and application?
37	Comity is, at its heart, a recognition that respect for territorial sovereignty should not indiscriminately interfere with or obstruct the provision of justice or participation in international commerce. How that principle has been translated into specific and practical legal procedures or rules – whether as the basis for enforcement of foreign judgments or awards, management of cross-border insolvency, or determination of the appropriate seat for the hearing of a matter – should not obscure the fundamental bases and justification which comity provides for why foreign courts should cooperate, namely: justice and commerce. In some cases, comity as applied in practice bears little superficial resemblance to the doctrine as originally described by Huber. Sometimes its use, interpretation, and evolution is disjointed, but at its root, it is a respect for justice and commerce. 
38	It needs to be recalled that comity, as originally conceived, was designed to serve as a legal principle (an overarching norm and a philosophical legal theory) and not as a defined set of rules. Comity is, in truth, a “little understood concept…upon which so much depends, and which is often more a matter of legal fiction than of reality or principle”.
Comity as “reciprocity”
39	One of the major developments of comity has been its reinterpretation as a doctrine based on reciprocity, particularly within the context of its application to the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards and decrees. This reinterpretation can been traced back to 1895 in the decision of Hilton v Guyot where the United States’ Supreme Court stated that: “there is a distinct and independent ground upon which we are satisfied that the comity of our nation does not require us to give conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France; and that ground is the want of reciprocity, on the part of France, as to the effect to be given to the judgments of this and other foreign countries.” Later the Court indicated that it had proceeded upon “the broad ground that international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the principles of international law recognized in most civilised nations, and by the comity of our own country, which it is our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled to be considered conclusive”. In Hilton v Guyot the Court had initially defined comity more generally as the “recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protections of its laws”. 
40	Perhaps the use of reciprocity by the Court was not intended as a redefinition of comity, but merely as a particular application of the “public policy” exception to it – a lack of reciprocity being a discretionary basis upon which the Court could decide that comity did not require recognition in this specific context. This, however, is not how this decision has generally been interpreted. Instead, following Hilton, there has been a tendency globally to require reciprocity before foreign judgments and arbitral awards will be recognised, creating both a change in practice and in the interpretation given to comity. This reinterpretation has shifted the focus and moving force of comity – whereas previously the question was: Will enforcing this law be prejudicial to or impair my interests? Now the question is: Will this other country also enforce my law? Previously the desire was to ensure that commerce and trade could be facilitated, now the desire is to reflect diplomatic relations. It has been argued that this perception that comity depends on reciprocity was a major reason why the doctrine was in modern times criticised and rejected in England and why instead the “law of the forum” has replaced comity as the basis for international conflicts law in much of Europe. 
41	American courts themselves have also been critical of this reinterpretation, with the New York Court of Appeals ruling in 1926 that the “imposition of a judgments reciprocity requirement would impermissibly impose national prerogatives on otherwise private disputes” and arguing that “Comity is not a rule of law, but it is a rule of ‘practice, convenience and expediency. It is something more than mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the opinion of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uniformity of decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of the same question’…[and] therefore rests, not on the basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the persuasiveness of the foreign judgment”. By persuasiveness the Court was referring to whether the foreign Court had “judicially, honestly, and with full jurisdiction and with the intention to arrive at the right conclusion” enquired into the facts of the case. Likewise scholars have argued that reciprocity “is a political rather than legal question” and therefore should not be the basis for determining whether foreign law should be recognised. Much of this criticism appears to stem from commercial concerns, as well as support for the principle of party autonomy, on the basis that a failure (or unwillingness) to recognise and enforce foreign decisions would create additional and unnecessary expense, uncertainty and delay for commercial parties.
42	Relevantly, the discussion by the New York Court of Appeals in Johnston of the elements of the notion of “persuasiveness”, also provides the foundation for the doctrine of comity to allow for the examination of the judgments of foreign courts, for instance in considering the place of seat and enforcement courts in international commercial arbitration. 
43	Further, reciprocity, as a developed law of practice, rather misses the point of the theory of comity – or at least it appears to have done so, in its application. The very point, the essential concern, for which comity was developed was a desire to understand and justify why foreign law (and decrees) should be applied and have force domestically. It is to be remembered that comity never demanded an automatic or unexamined application – it did not operate as a matter of obligation. Comity justifies recognition of foreign law on the basis of fairness, justice, commerce, and respect between courts. Reciprocity would seek to justify it on the basis of acting in kind and as promoting mutual exchange. 
44	Despite such criticisms, this conception of comity has become an influential form in modern law, being the defining criteria by which most nations agree to give effect to foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards, as well as a prevailing feature within international instruments relating to such enforcement. The principle of comity as expressed in Hilton v Guyot also continues to be cited within numerous decisions in the British Commonwealth and United States. The pervasiveness of this change in definition of comity is further reflected in the comments of Dr Cheshire, writing in 1961, who criticised the concept of comity on the basis that it is “incompatible with the judicial function, for comity is a matter for sovereigns…moreover if courtesy formed the basis of private international law a judge might feel compelled to ignore the law of Utopia upon proof that Utopian courts apply no law but their own, since comity implies a bilateral, not a unilateral, relationship”. In Dr Cheshire’s view (and many others) comity is now equivalent to or dependent on reciprocity. Whether this reconceptualisation is fair (or even truly accurate) may be debated. The fact that it is prevalent, however, needs to be acknowledged and considered. 
45	In the case of international arbitration, reciprocity is expressly recognised and supported in the foundational modern international text – the New York Convention 1958. This text specifically provides that contracting States may, “on the basis of reciprocity”, choose to only recognise and enforce awards made in another Contracting State. Tellingly, of the 156 contracting parties to this Convention, more than half have adopted such an approach. Whilst the practical significance of this has diminished somewhat over the last 50 years (as more and more States have ratified the Convention), it does reflect the pervasiveness of reciprocity as a theoretical underpinning of public and private international law. Through this hugely important Convention the notion of reciprocity as a relevant factor in relation to the recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees has also been reintroduced to nations (such as England) who had previously rejected it.
46	On the other hand, the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration (as amended in 2006) explicitly rejects reciprocity as a basis for recognition of foreign awards. In the Commentary the seat of arbitration is said merely to be a reflection of a choice of convenience by the parties, and should not be a sufficient reason to hinder commercial practices. In some respects this Model Law is more consistent with the original ideals of comity – that, in the interests of justice and facilitation of commerce, countries should, as a matter of respect, recognise and enforce foreign law, with the only exception being for reasons of public policy or prejudice. Interestingly 69 states have adopted the Model Law (each of whom had previously adopted the New York Convention), and of those states 41 had previously, under the New York Convention, indicated that they would only enforce awards where there was reciprocity. 
47	With regards to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, most countries, through their domestic legislation, require reciprocity before foreign judgments will automatically be enforced. Where reciprocity is not present, parties seeking to enforce judgments must resort to the ordinary law. An attempt to reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with such a system has recently been made in the Hague Conference Choice of Court Convention which would operate in a similar manner to the New York Convention – under articles 8 and 9 any judgment rendered by the chosen court must be recognised and enforced by other Contracting States, except where a ground for refusal applies. Again, this Convention incorporates reciprocity as the basis for judicial assistance; and is intended both to protect party autonomy and to provide greater predictability and certainty in international trade and commerce. For now however this Convention has limited influence, having only come into operation on 1 October 2015 after its ratification by the European Union and Mexico.
Comity as “obligation”
48	Comity has also been reinterpreted as a source of obligation. In England commentators rejected the American reliance on notions of “reciprocity”, with Dicey for example stating in 1896 that “if…comity is meant to imply that, to take a concrete case, when English judges apply French law, they do so out of courtesy to the French Republic, then the term comity is used to cover a view which, if really held by any serious thinker, affords a singular specimen of confusion of thought produced by laxity of language”. This wariness of reciprocity continues today, with the Court in Adams v Cape Industries plc, for example, rejecting comity as the prevailing doctrine for the recognition of foreign judgments on the basis that England will not limit its jurisdiction only to circumstances where there is reciprocity. 
49	In England the enforcement of foreign judgments and decrees came to be justified not on the basis of reciprocity or comity, but because a foreign competent court had imposed a duty or obligation on the defendant, and that domestic courts were accordingly bound to enforce such a duty and obligation, just as they would enforce an obligation arising under contract (as an action on the debt). Anything which negatives that duty or which forms a legal excuse for not performing it would be a defence to the action. This approach eliminates the need to seek reciprocity.
50	Whether this approach is accurately characterised as a reinterpretation of comity or as a replacement for comity may be debated. In a modern context, one significant thing to note about “obligation” is that its rules often play a role alongside “reciprocity”, with common law jurisdictions resorting to the rules of obligation where there is no international or statutory arrangement (such as the New York Convention), and no relevant treaty, which would otherwise provide for the automatic, reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments and decrees. Thus, to some degree, whilst the rules of obligation may have originally been intended as an alternative or replacement to comity (and, thus as a separate doctrine of law), in some respects the two now work jointly.
51	More importantly, if one returns to the original conception of comity – as a principle justifying the application of foreign law by reference to the interests of justice and commerce (and not as a principle concerning reciprocity) – then the law of obligations which has developed does not seem so divorced from it. In particular, both “obligation” and “comity” have drawn upon the Roman concept of ius gentium to justify why rights and liabilities arising within one territory (and which therefore would ordinarily be restricted in their application to that territory) should be recognised and enforced elsewhere – one has utilised terms such as “mutual respect” and “assistance”, the other terms of “legal obligation” or “moral obligation”. Furthermore both recognise that in certain cases, interests such as public policy may require that foreign decrees not be given force or recognition. 
52	It is unfortunate, in this respect, that the place of reciprocity in American jurisprudence has had such a far reaching impact that academics and jurists have conceived the common law of obligation and notion of comity as being diametrically opposed. Even in the last few years this misconception about comity has persisted. One academic, for example, recently argued that comity should, in line with modern practice, no longer be seen as a principle “promoting or expecting reciprocity of treatment from foreign courts”, but rather that it be reinterpreted as “a judicial approach which accords significant deference to the judgments of foreign courts in the context of local recognition and enforcement” . The irony in this of course is that this “reinterpretation” is really, in truth, a return to the expression of the matter in the 17th century by Ulrich Huber himself; it is a return to the original foundations of comity, not a pioneering, modern conception of it. 
53	Nevertheless we should acknowledge the fact that English commentators (along with others) have, over the past few decades, increasingly come to accept that comity (as so understood) has an enduring role in public and private international law (and in judicial decision-making in this area), and that they have accordingly shifted away from Dicey’s staunchly critical stance on the matter. Likewise it must be seen as positive that common law courts over the past 30 years have actively cited and endorsed the concept of comity as understood by Huber, Mansfield and Story, with the English Court of Appeal noting, for example, in 1984 that comity involves “good neighbourliness, common courtesy and mutual respect between those who labour in adjoining judicial vineyards”. When this is so acknowledged then the doctrine of obligation may be more properly seen not as a concept opposed to comity or designed to replace it, but rather as the reflection of rules of practice developed by the common law for the application of comity to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Likewise the defences developed by the common law in this area may be seen as the particular application of the comity defence of “public policy”.
Comity as “the seat” or “natural forum”
54	Another area of modern law that has a connection with comity, and which in turn may benefit from a consideration of the principle, is the debate regarding the appropriate “seat” or “forum” for a matter – a topic of particular relevance to the issue of anti-suit injunctions, to the practice of forum shopping by parties, and to the working out of the proper relationship between the seat and enforcement courts in international commercial arbitration.  
55	Whereas England distinguished comity by reference to obligation, continental Europe distinguished it by reference to the “seat” of the legal relationship, in line with the commentary of Friedrich von Savigny whose work dominated discussions of conflicts of law in Europe (and, in turn, in civil law). Like Mansfield and Story, Savigny rejected statutism and supported the principle of independent sovereignty as expressed in Huber’s proposition that all law was inherently territorial. Furthermore he also contended that in certain situations Courts should respect and give weight to foreign laws and decisions, justifying it on the basis of expediency and by reference to the fact that there were increasing relations (through commerce and trade) between foreign nations. 
56	However Savigny was critical of the notion that conflicts could be settled by a principle based on “mere generosity or arbitrarily will, which would imply that it was also uncertain and temporary”. In particular, he was critical of a system in which the States voluntarily applied foreign law or based such recognition upon “respect”. Instead Savigny contended that a set of uniform, binding rules should be developed, derived from the “international common law of nations” (based on existing customary law). These rules could in turn be applied by the Courts to determine the relevant “seat” for the legal relationship and dispute (through an analysis of the private connections involved in the case) and therefore the appropriate law to be applied, in recognition that “the same legal relations have to expect the same decision whether the judgment be pronounced in this state or in that”. In turn Savigny argued that such a system would allow rules of conflict of laws to develop on a universal and objective basis, and that it would guarantee uniform and fair results. Relevantly, the particular concern in Europe was to justify deference in terms of territorial or personal connections, rather than sovereign “interests”.
57	What is important to note is that whilst Savigny may have been critical of the deferential nature of comity, he was not critical of its underlying aim – that of determining, in a particular case, whether foreign law should be applied instead of domestic law, and of seeking to foster commercial relations. Rather this theory aimed to extend comity beyond a mere consideration of whether a State should allow foreign law and decrees to have extra-territorial application, to also include a consideration of whether a State should refuse to exercise its possible jurisdiction over a matter, on the basis that the case has greater connection with a foreign jurisdiction. In this respect Savigny’s work may be seen as an attempt to broaden comity to include jurisdictional analysis, and to develop practical rules for such an analysis. 
58	Ultimately Savigny’s attempt to develop a series of uniform and binding rules failed to materialise. However the idea of determining and identifying the “proper law” to be applied, in circumstances of competing jurisdictions, has remained. In Europe it is apparent in the application of a test of “effective and significant connection between the regulating state and the activity to be regulated”. In England (and other common law countries) it may be argued that Savigny’s ideas have been picked up in principles such as “forum non conveniens” and the “natural or proper forum”, according to which the Court is required to consider either whether it is a “clearly inappropriate forum” or what is the jurisdiction in which the case would most suitably be tried. Meanwhile aspects of this idea may have been picked up in America within the notion of reasonableness in exercising one’s jurisdiction (to be discussed shortly). Together these modern doctrines reflect a concern for circumstances where courts may refuse to exercise jurisdiction which they would otherwise be entitled to exert it.
59	Discussion of the appropriate forum as the place or ‘seat’ of a dispute has gained even greater attention in recent years (and, in turn, has created greater challenges) due to changes in commercial practices, including the influence of globalisation and the rise in transnational litigation and commerce, and the growth in number and influence of multinational corporations. These commercial realities have meant that more often than not multiple jurisdictions may be able legitimately to claim to be the natural forum, or to have a significant connection with the matter. Likewise it has made it more likely that parties might institute parallel proceedings or seek to have a matter restrained (through anti-suit injunctions, and stay of proceedings)  on the basis that it should be heard elsewhere. Moreover it has become common practice amongst commercial parties to include choice of court, choice of forum, or choice of law clauses within their contracts (and thereby to seek to determine for themselves what will be considered the appropriate seat, venue, or jurisdiction). This, in turn, has reintroduced the question of party autonomy into the jurisdictional analysis, and raised the question of whether “party consent” may legitimately be seen as a separate, internationally recognised and relatively uncontroversial basis of jurisdiction. 
60	For the purposes of our discussion today this is relevant for two reasons. For one, it demonstrates again the manner in which commercial practices and needs can have a significant impact on the development of the law, as well as the fact that where the law is uncertain parties will attempt to manage the risk by determining such questions for themselves. Secondly, it is relevant from the fact that proceedings such as anti-suit injunctions have been criticised as being an indirect interference with the processes of the foreign court and, to this extent, being contrary to the principle of comity. Indeed some have argued that “upholding the contractual bargain to arbitrate in the forum generally trumps considerations of comity”.
61	What then is the place of comity within this context of an increasing focus upon respect for party autonomy and the contractual bargain?  We return again to what comity is, at its very essence, concerned about – justice and fostering commerce. Nothing in this changing approach to a chosen forum goes against it. Rather it may be argued that deference is being shown to commercial parties, in an attempt to: provide practical justice, avoid duplication and the imposition of additional transactional costs, prevent vexatious or oppressive proceedings from continuing, and to respect instances where the parties have identified a foreign jurisdiction as the more “appropriate forum”. 
62	Furthermore, comity as a theory of deference to foreign courts remains important (perhaps even more so) in the context of anti-suit injunctions, as a basis upon which one Court may refuse to continue to exercise its jurisdiction in a matter. Indeed, it has been noted that “in the context of transnational litigation, one of the key elements affecting the exercise of that discretion [to grant an anti-suit injunction], is the consideration of comity”.
63	Thus for example, in Telesto Investments the parties had obtained an anti-suit injunction from the High Court of Singapore, and comity was held to be a relevant factor in determining whether a stay of proceedings should accordingly be granted by an Australian court – because otherwise the “continued prosecution of these proceedings…would be in defiance of an anti-suit injunction”. As such, the concern to give effect to party autonomy – by allowing anti-suit injunctions where the parties would seek to act in a manner contrary to their contractual agreement – supports the concern to give effect to comity, as such injunctions would be altogether meaningless unless it can be assured that other courts will respect such a decision. Thus what began as an attempt by Savigny to create universal and binding rules to replace the discretionary principle of comity has today led to a re-emergence and re-emphasis on comity as a relevant factor for the enforcement of anti-suit injunctions and a basis upon which courts may choose to grant a stay on proceedings in their own jurisdiction. 
Comity as “reasonableness”
64	In this context of jurisdictional analysis, another recharacterisation of comity should briefly be mentioned – that of “reasonableness” or the “rule of reason”. This concept has emerged in the past few decades and has its origins within American anti-trust cases, where it was conceived of as a means of justifying judicial restraint. It is, in essence, a principle concerned with jurisdiction and is designed to address circumstances where more than one State may be regarded as having a legitimate jurisdiction to determine a matter. In turn, reasonableness seeks to provide a basis for why Courts may choose to decline to exercise jurisdiction and to permit the matter to be decided by a foreign jurisdiction instead (or conversely, how Courts may justify the exercise of their own jurisdiction over a matter which also concerns a foreign jurisdiction). It does so by requiring the Courts to apply an “interest balancing” test, in which it is required to consider and weigh the interests and connections involved in a case (both foreign and domestic) in order to determine the more appropriate jurisdiction to hear a matter. This in turn has been said to reflect the idea, as stated by Chief Justice Burger, that we “cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.” Or, as stated by Judge Cardozo, it is meant to demonstrate that: “we are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.”
65	The dominant expression of this principle is seen within the Restatement (Third) of US Foreign Relations Law (published in 1987) which states that “a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable”. Whether or not jurisdiction is regarded as reasonable is to be determined by reference to a list of non-exclusive factors, such as “(1) the location of the conduct in question, (2) the nationality of the parties, (3) the character of the conduct in question, (4) the foreign policy interests of the United States, and (5) any public policy interests”. Where it would not be unreasonable for either State to exercise jurisdiction, “a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater”. 
66	This approach has been closely tied to Huber’s conception of comity, and it has been argued that reasonableness is merely an attempt to clarify conceptually the limitations on jurisdiction imposed by comity and to develop the theory into an objective norm of public international law. Thus, for example, the Court in Timberlane stated that “‘jurisdictional’ forebearance in the international setting is more a question of comity and fairness than one of international power”. More recently it has been argued that the concept of reasonableness also encapsulates an understanding that deference should be shown not only to foreign sovereigns and courts, but also to the private parties involved in a dispute – that where parties have negotiated for, and included in their bargain, foreign choice of law or forum clauses, then the Courts should show deference to this, rather than imposing their own legal system. 
67	Despite attempts within America to define reasonableness as a norm of international law, it has remained a notion limited for the most part to American case law. However at its core it may be seen to have much in common with the concept of the appropriate forum or seat for a matter and may, to that extent, be perceived as another factor in determining whether or not a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction, on the basis that it is more appropriate (or “reasonable”) for a foreign court to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. 
Comity as “judicial cooperation and assistance” or “modified universalism”
68	Turning then to one final area of modern commercial law where comity can be seen to have an enduring influence – the promotion of judicial cooperation and assistance, including in areas of court procedure and the conduct of cross-border insolvency litigation. This trend has been described as a movement towards a “global community of courts” in which respect is shown to foreign law and decrees not out of a sense of debt owed to nations or sovereigns, but out of respect owed to other judges, as well as a sense of obligation to the community of litigants “with a view to responding to modern mobility and the needs of a world or national economic order”.
69	There is not the time here to consider all of the different aspects in which an increased sense of international judicial collegiality has been shown in the past few decades. To name but a few it includes: cooperation and provision of mutual legal assistance in the prosecution of criminal matters, assistance in resolving instances of unlawful child abduction, transmission of evidence between states, and service of legal documents overseas. This “judicial globalisation” and increase in “international collegiality” is also reflected in developments such as the signing of Memorandum of Understanding between foreign courts, and participation in international conferences and foreign judicial delegations, which have “considerably expanded the mutual understanding amongst judges of other legal systems. It has transformed the concept of judicial comity.” Similarly, the mutual confidence and interaction between Courts is reflected in the regular references to each other’s jurisprudence and in the close engagement of commercial law judges with each other in the region, as was, for example, discussed in a recent arbitration decision in Australia.
70	The other area where calls for judicial cooperation and assistance have been prominent, and where comity has increasingly been invoked, is in the context of cross-border insolvency. It is relevant to note here briefly that this issue is not new or unique to the modern globalised world. Rather, lex maritima has had in place for millennia “a sophisticated and generally harmonious system of dealing with cross-border insolvencies”, which was developed by merchants and traders, and reflected “the demands of the early international mercantile community for a coherent means of enforcing claims against a peripatetic asset”. Today, the same desire has been reflected in the view “that bankruptcy (whether personal or corporate) should be unitary and universal. There should be a unitary bankruptcy proceeding in the court of the bankrupt’s domicile which receives world-wide recognition and it should apply universally to all the bankrupt’s assets.”
71	The rise in transnational commerce and trade, combined with the increase in the number of multinational companies with assets distributed across many jurisdictions (as seen most recently, and dramatically, in the global financial crisis), has created new challenges for commercial law, and has seen a significant increase in the number of insolvency proceedings involving multiple nations and numerous claims, subsidiaries, affiliated entities, assets, operations, and creditors. As a result cross-border insolvency has been described as “the single most significant field requiring a high level of international cooperation between courts of different nations”. Further adding to these difficulties is the fact that the transaction costs ordinarily associated with transnational litigation – including delay and duplication – bear even greater significance for insolvency, since it may tie up significant amounts of capital and the resulting delay may cause further erosion in the status of the insolvent. 
72	The response from jurists, and the commercial community more generally, has been once again to take into account the principles of comity as originally conceived by Huber, Story and Mansfield – as “a set of general principles governing when the courts and legal rules of a particular country pay deference to legal rules or proceedings of another country”. In particular, since the Maxwell Corporation litigation of the early 1990s, there has been a demonstrated willingness across a number of jurisdictions to approach the matter of cross-border insolvency in a highly pragmatic and cooperative way, as demonstrated both in judicial practice (through the development of “modified universalism” ) and the creation of new international instruments (such as the 1997 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which has currently been adopted by 40 states).
73	In the case of the Model Law, articles 25-27 explicitly encourage a system in which jurisdictions will defer to and assist and cooperate with foreign jurisdictions, in order to allow cross-border insolvency proceedings to be settled in a single jurisdiction (the centre of main interest). Furthermore the framework of the Model Law is built upon a universalist approach – it requires that “one insolvency proceeding will be universally recognised by the jurisdictions in which the entity has assets or carries on business” and “treats the multinational bankruptcy as a single process in the foreign main proceeding, with other courts assisting in that single proceeding”.
74	These provisions, in turn, were derived from the private international law framework that preceded it – the principle of “modified universalism”. Lord Hoffmann succinctly expressed this notion in In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd as such:
“The primary rule of private international law which seems to me applicable to this case is the principle of (modified) universalism, which has been the golden thread running through English cross-border insolvency law since the 18th century. That principle requires that English courts should, so far as is consistent with justice and UK public policy, co-operate with the courts in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the company's assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system of distribution.”
75	One can see quite clearly here the fundamental aspects of comity – a concern for mutual respect, cooperation and assistance between countries, to promote the interests of commerce and justice. The essential focus of the cross-border insolvency jurisprudence has been to address the inherent uncertainties which would otherwise arise from cross-border transactions and to minimise transaction costs. What is also significant is that the approach to cross-border insolvency has not adopted a reciprocity requirement (in contrast to international arbitration, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments). In some respects therefore, this area of the law may be seen as the one most closely linked to comity, as originally understood by Huber, and which will hopefully, in turn, serve as an example of the need for cooperation, communication, assistance, and deference between courts in the transnational commercial context. 
CLOSING REMARKS
76	What then can we conclude about comity and commerce? To some extent it can reasonably be argued that comity, as a principle, has undergone an identity crisis. Some writers suggest that it has become practically obsolete, others relegate it to being simply an American doctrine, whilst still others contend that it is coextensive with public international law. Much of this confusion reflects the difficulty encountered in extracting the essential essence of comity from the rules of practice which have sought to apply it and from the definitions which various persons have given to comity (many of which include reference to ideas that comity did not originally have nor intended to profess). 
77	What needs to be recognised is that Huber did not limit comity to one practical aspect or another, and neither should we. It is the general ideas, not the specific rules to which we should turn in understanding comity. Comity’s overarching commitment to commerce and justice, and the belief that matters of national interests should not indiscriminately override such commitments, are as relevant today as they were in the 16th century. It may be true that comity is at times a vague principle. However, arguably, it is no more so than other legal principles such as foreseeability, honesty, fairness, or good faith. Yet we have not rejected those on the basis that they are too elusive. Indeed, their relevance to commerce has become more and more lauded in recent years, particularly in light of demonstrations of their absence in international commerce and business. When one examines the various ways in which comity has been reinterpreted, applied, and demonstrated in the past few centuries – as reciprocity, obligation, the appropriate “seat” or “forum”, reasonableness, and judicial cooperation – we see a theory that is still influential and still relevant. The demand for justice and for the facilitation of commerce has not diminished in the past few centuries, rather it has increased exponentially, and Courts and nations still seek to recognise and pursue such goals. 
78	What has been most influential, perhaps, in recent decades has been the greater respect placed on party autonomy and on holding parties to their bargain. Likewise there has been even greater focus on reducing transactional costs of commerce and in preventing parties from being able to “forum shop” in order to get the outcome they desire, to the detriment of finality and to the cost of both the parties and the Courts. Such changes in outlook, and in the realities of commerce, have meant that comity is today invoked not simply out of deference or respect to the status of a foreign state and as way of justifying incursion of the law into a foreign territory. Rather it is invoked in the context of attempts to provide practical justice to commercial parties, avoiding duplication and additional transactional costs as well as vexatious or oppressive proceedings, and respecting the jurisdiction of foreign courts where they are seen as the more “appropriate forum”. In this sense there is deference more to the needs of commerce and the global markets, than of deference due to “nations”. It is no longer “comity of nations” but “judicial comity”. 
79	This change in approach to conflict of laws again highlights and reflects the influence which commercial practices and demands can have on the law. The fact that transnational and cross-border litigation has increased significantly since the 19th century has required the courts to focus on developing a global legal community rather than on focusing on respecting the boundaries based on national sovereignty. In particular it reflects the demands of commercial parties for efficiency, consistency, and cost effective methods of dispute resolution, and for there to be respect for party autonomy (including in choice of law and choice of forum clauses). Comity remains important for commercial transactions because such transactions are regularly conducted in multiple forums (and may require enforcement in additional forums, due to the distribution of assets). Perhaps the most important role of comity is that serves “to fill gaps which cannot be left as voids, and to explain the proper limits of the rules which are laid down elsewhere.”
80	The potential importance of theory to the everyday solution of transnational legal problems was highlighted recently by a decision of the High Court of Australia, PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pty Ltd. There the court concluded that the Supreme Court of Western Australia did indeed have the power to make a freezing order in relation to a prospective judgment of a foreign (Singapore) court which could be registrable in Australia pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth). (It should be noted that the Act has a foundation of reciprocity.) What is notable in the decision is that it proceeded upon a distinctively territorial basis; all members of the Bench focused exclusively upon the limits of the Supreme Court’s power and upon the possibility that its enforcement process might otherwise be frustrated. In turn, the relief which was granted was given, not by reference to the Singapore proceedings, but out of a consideration of the potential Supreme Court proceeding for enforcement.  
81	Would it have been possible for the Court to have adopted a different approach, by reference to the fact that the actions of the Singapore Court, the legitimate expectations of the commercial parties, and international commerce itself, might have been frustrated, in the absence of an order from the Supreme Court, by the ease and speed of modern day asset transfers? The need for judicial cooperation and assistance to address the needs of international commercial parties, and the difficulties created by transnational commerce, has long been recognised in our region and, indeed, already underpins our approach to matters such as international arbitration and cross-border insolvency. Furthermore, with regards to Singapore in particular, a close relation has already been established between the two countries, including through a memorandum of understanding, and agreement for reciprocity in the enforcement of foreign judgments, in recognition of the value of close cooperation for mutual benefit in the administration of justice. In such a context, there may have been a broader, more internationally focused justification available for such orders. 
82	What are we then to conclude from all this? Ultimately, we do apply comity. We do seek to justify why foreign law should have application alongside the application of territorial sovereignty. We do seek to promote commerce and the facilitation of foreign trade, indeed now more than ever. Therefore we should reflect upon the creation, and essential features, of the place of comity in its fostering. That is what I hope I have done, if but a little, today. 
8 November 2015